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The degree of substitutability between social security wealth and private wealth is a much-debated topic; 
however, less time and energy has been devoted to the study of the distributive properties of a measure of 
wealth  summing  future  pension benefits net of  contributions to the other traditional components of 
households’ net worth (financial and real activities, net of liabilities). The present paper has two essential 
aims: by using the last six cross-sections of the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Income and Wealth, it firstly aims 
to  estimate an “augmented” measure of net worth  incorporating social security wealth, and secondly it 
examines the composition and distribution of such augmented wealth among Italian households during the 
period 1991-2002. The result is that augmented wealth is found to have fallen over the last decade due to two 
opposing forces, namely an increase in net worth and a parallel , stronger decline in social security wealth, 
resulting from the two main pension reforms implemented in 1992 and 1995. Wealth inequality, after rising 
steeply at the beginning of the 1990s, levelled off during the second part of the period in question. The major 
contribution towards this upwards movement came from  social security wealth, the distribution of which, 
although less unequal than that of real wealth and financial wealth, widened  at a much faster pace at the 
beginning of the decade. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Future social security benefits constitute a major part of total  household wealth in all developed 
countries. Any analysis of the accumulation and distribution of wealth, and of its evolution over 
time, would therefore be misleading were it not to include the value of annuities expected from the 
pension system. In order to take account of  the effects of the pay-as-you-go system on wealth 
distribution in the US, Feldstein (1976) introduced an “augmented” definition of household wealth, 
whereby social security wealth was added to the other traditional components of each household’s 
net worth. Otherstudies, and  in particular those by  Kennickel and Sunden (1997) and by  Wolff 
(1987 and 2003), further refined the analysis of the distributional effects of the pension system on 
total wealth. All of these studies concluded that social security wealth had a clearly mitigating effect 
on the distribution of total wealth in the United States, whereas the effect of private pension wealth 
was perceived as being of a more mixed nature. 
The main aim of this present paper is to estimate an augmented definition of wealth for Italian 
households, in order to evaluate the effects of the Italian Social Security system on the distribution 
of total wealth during the period 1991-2002. Several important events during this decade render this 
analysis  of  particular interest: i) three structural reforms of the public pension system  were 
introduced (1992, 1995 and 1997), nearly halving the aggregate value of social security wealth, 
reducing the internal rate of return and enhancing the actuarial degree of fairness of the system. The 
reduction in  social security wealth was  of an  uneven nature,  affecting diverse  cohorts and 
productive categories within Italian society to different degrees; ii) there were important changes to 
the allocation of financial activities during the course of the decade, ending in the bursting of the 
financial bubble; iii) the real component of net worth, and in particular real estate, grew steadily 
from 1992 onwards, thus counterbalancing the effect of the bursting of the financial bubble. 
The distributive effects of ii) and iii) on the net worth of Italian households have been empirically 
analysed by Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000), and with particular accuracy by Brandolini et al. (2004). 
Both  the latter studies  base their estimations of net worth on the  Bank of Italy’s “ Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth” (SHIW). By using data from this survey’s historical archive for the 
period 1991-2002, we estimate a broader definition of household wealth which includes the present 
value of  those  future pension benefits (net of payroll taxes) expected by  the retired and active 
population.  
The paper is organised as follows:  section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on the 
distributive effects of social security systems on the distribution of wealth; section 3 describes the 
data sources and the accounting framework for the definition of total wealth used in this paper;   3 
section 4 presents the estimation of social security wealth; section 5 offers  new microeconomic 
evidence of the composition and inequality of total wealth in Italy during the period 1991-2002; and 
section 6 presents our conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Overview of recent studies  
 
The introduction and growth of public pension programs radically influences the process of saving 
and wealth accumulation. In Italy, as in the majority of developed countries, future social security 
benefits represent a substantial part of total household wealth. Since Feldstein’s study (1974), which 
introduced the concept of social security wealth for the first time, this variable has been empirically 
estimated using both aggregate and survey data. In particular the degree of substitutability between 
social security wealth and private wealth has been tested in a large number of analyses designed to 
verify the validity of the life-cycle hypothesis (for Italy studies, see Rossi and Visco 1990, Jappelli 
1995). Social security wealth measures and estimates have also been widely employed in political 
and economic debate in order to gauge the sustainability of the public pension system, the long-term 
effects of pay-as-you-go systems on public finance  (Oecd 1990, Sartor 2002, Brugiavini and 
Peracchi 2004), and the effects of pension rules on labour supply decisions (Brugiavini and 
Peracchi 2003). 
Fewer studies have tried to analyse  the distributive properties of social security wealth:  the 
exceptions are the works by Feldstein (1976), Wolff (1987, 2003), Mc Garry (1999) and Kennickell 
and Sunden (1999), providing estimations of the distributive effects of this variable in the US. All 
of  these studies define the total wealth of each household as the sum of net worth, pensions and 
social security wealth. According to Feldstein (1976), the exclusion of social security wealth would 
distort the real picture of the distribution of household wealth. In his study he uses survey data to 
estimate a measure of social security wealth derived from the current distribution of earnings in a 
steady-state hypothesis. He finds that total wealth in the US is much less concentrated after the 
inclusion of social security wealth. The Gini coefficient for net worth is 0.72, while for total wealth 
it is down to 0.51. Moreover, the distribution of total wealth among income classes is more similar 
to the distribution of social security wealth than to that of net worth. McDermod et al. (1987) find 
that pensions represent 43% of  the  net worth  of those households  where pensions are received. 
Wolff (1987) shows that social security wealth has a pronounced equalising effect on the 
distribution of total wealth. He simulates the lifetime wealth distribution of the US population and 
finds that private pension wealth is less equally distributed than disposable wealth, but its   4 
magnitude is very low. In contrast, the inclusion of social security wealth produces a marked 
reduction in measured wealth distribution. The Gini coefficient decreases from 0.73 to between 0.49 
and 0.60. This marked reduction in  inequality can be explained by the fact that social security 
wealth is much more evenly distributed than disposable wealth, and its magnitude is very close to 
that of traditional household wealth. Kennikel and Sunden (1999) also find that social security 
wealth constitutes a substantial part of total wealth, and its introduction has had an equalising effect 
on US wealth distribution. In particular, they show that the bottom 90% of the population hold the 
overwhelmingly proportion of social security wealth, whereas the top 0.5% own 45% of business 
assets and 30% of traded corporate stocks. Gustmann et al. (1997) estimate that pensions, social 
security wealth and health insurance account for half of the wealth held by all households with an 
average age of  between 51 and 61. In a more recent paper, Wolff (2003) estimates distributive 
trends for various measures of wealth which show that the inclusion of social security wealth results 
in a marked reduction  in the Gini coefficient for total wealth, from 0.822 to 0.657 in 1998. This 
reflects both the lower level of inequality in social security wealth than in marketable wealth, as 
well as its relatively low correlation to net worth. Over a 16-year period (1983-1998) the equalising 
effect of social security wealth decreased. 
Relatively few studies have empirically explored  wealth distribution in Italy (Cannari and 
D’Alessio 1994, Jappelli  and Pistaferri 2000, Brandolini et al. 2004). To our knowledge, none of 
these studies includes an estimate of social security wealth and its redistributive impact. Cannari 
and D’Alessio (1994) examine household wealth inequality using the 1991 SHIW, and show that at 
the beginning of the last decade, the proportion of net worth (defined as the total market value of 
dwellings, consumer durables and financial assets, net of debts) held by the richest decile amounted  
to 39%, while the corresponding figure for the poorest decile was a mere 0.2%. Using data drawn 
from four cross-sections (1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995) of the Bank of Italy’s SHIW, Jappelli and 
Pistaferri (2000) characterise the static and dynamic features of  wealth distribution, and compare 
them with consumption and income inequality. They distinguish between net worth and financial 
wealth, where the former is defined as the sum of households’ financial assets and real net assets. 
The authors found that wealth distributions are by far more right-skewed and dispersed than the 
corresponding distributions for consumption and disposable income: net worth and financial wealth 
displayed Gini indexes of 0.59 and 0.70 respectively in 1995, as opposed to scores of 0.30 and 0.36 
for consumption and disposable income. Examining wealth distribution by income deciles, they 
also discovered that both  mean and median wealth monotonically increase with the household’s 
ranking in the income distribution table, implying a strong correlation between the relative positions 
of the two distributions. Finally, the transition matrices for net worth and financial wealth in 1993   5 
and 1995 showed a relatively limited degree of wealth mobility, with slightly less immobility in the 
distribution of financial wealth. Using the SHIW historical archive, Brandolini et al. (2004) have 
more recently investigated the composition and distribution of wealth among Italian households, 
together with its evolution from 1989 to 2000. They  have found that wealth distribution is a lot 
more unequal than  income distribution: in 2000 the Gini index was 0.61 for net worth, compared 
with 0.37 for disposable income. The corresponding values of the Gini index for the main 
components of net worth were 0.60 for real assets, compared with a much higher value of 0.81 for 
financial  assets. Wealth inequality declined from 1989 to 1991 and then rose considerably during 
the rest of the decade, due mainly to the large gains made at the very top of the distribution. In 
particular, a substantial part of the increase in net worth inequality was traceable to financial assets, 
which have both increased their weight in portfolios and become more heavily concentrated. 
 
 
3.   Data sources and the accounting framework 
 
The data used in this study are taken from the 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002 Surveys of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted by the Bank of Italy. The sample size is about 
8,000 units per year. The survey gathers information on household microeconomic behaviour and 
on the socio-demographic characteristics of household members. The basic unit of observation is 
the “household”, defined as all persons related by blood, marriage or affection, residing under the 
same roof and pooling all or part of their incomes. Institutional population is not included. The 
SHIW, much like all sample surveys on household income and wealth,  suffers from  a lack of 
response. In the last six surveys the response rate (net of those units not found at the address given) 
has been variable, and sometimes has been considerably low. It has ranged from a minimum of 36.1 
% in 2002 to a maximum of 72.0 % in 1993. Non-response in statistical surveys is obviously a 
matter of concern  whenever it  produces  samples where the less co-operative segments of the 
population,  usually  the richer households, are under-represented. To limit these potentially 
distorting effects, each household is weighted by an appropriate sample weight.  However,  no 
allowance is  made for taking  account of  the household size or composition:  in other words,  no 
equivalence scale is used. 
The principal concept of wealth used in this study is “augmented” wealth, which is defined as the 
sum of net worth and social security wealth (Davies and Shorrocks 2001, Wolff 2003). The first 
component of augmented wealth is net worth, which is equal to the total value of all those assets the   6 
household can sell in the market, less any debts
1. According to a number of authors (Feldstein 1976, 
Wolff 1987, Jappelli and Modigliani 1998), net worth is not a satisfactory definition of wealth in 
those countries where there is a mandatory, public, almost actuarially fair pension system (Lindbeck 
and Persson 2003). If contributions to a social security scheme are perceived by individuals as a 
substitute  for other forms of lifecycle saving,  then  a definition of wealth which  is  capable of 
measuring the stock of resources to be used to finance consumption, perhaps ought to consider the 
present value of future pension entitlements as well. This point is forcefully argued by Jappelli and 
Modigliani (1998); they point out that in any pension scheme, contributions entitle workers to 
receive a retirement pension, and  so contributions should be regarded as a (compulsory) component 
of life-cycle saving. On the other hand, pension benefits represent the utilisation of pension wealth 
that was previously accumulated prior to retirement. It is clear that the importance of this point 
increases with the size of the public pension system and with its degree of actuarial fairness, and is 
not related to whether the system is funded or not. 
In the case of actuarial fairness, the measurement of social security wealth at a given time is simply 
equal to the accrued capitalised value of pension entitlements. In all other situations (i.e. when the 
pension system’s internal rate of return is different from the market interest rate), the social security 
wealth of each individual should be measured as the difference between the present value of future 
pension benefits and that one of future payroll taxes. 
Italy has a very extensive pension system: the payroll tax is equal to 33% of gross earnings for 
employees and to 19% for the self-employed. Its degree of actuarial fairness will gradually increase 
as the 1995 reform is phased in. Therefore we believe that the definition of augmented wealth could 
offer a more complete description of both the level and the distributive properties of total wealth 
among Italian households. Accordingly, our definition of augmented or total wealth, TW, at time t 
can be summarised as follow: 
 
TWt = ARt + AFt – PFt + SSWNt 
 
Where AR is the sum of consumer durable goods, jewellery and other valuables, real estate and 
businesses; AF is the sum of all financial assets; PF measures all debts and SSWN is the present 
value of future pension benefits net of the expected contributions  to be paid  from the time of 
observation until retirement. Our definition of total wealth does not include cash and currency, 
                                                 
1 Following the definition used in the SHIW, net worth is here defined as the total value of tangible assets (real estates, 
business equity and other valuables) and financial assets (transaction and saving accounts, government bonds, equities 
and other assets), net of financial liabilities (mortgages and other debts).   7 
severance indemnity and the cash value of life insurance and private retirement accounts, which are 
not recorded in our data source. 
Comparisons with external sources such as the national accounts show that the quality of net worth 
estimates in the SHIW is under-reported, this being particularly so in the case of  financial assets. 
According to some calculations made from the SHIW historical archives, transactions and savings 
accounts appear to  have been  underestimated  over the last decade by an average of 64%, 
government bonds by 70%, and private bonds, company shares and investment shares by 85 % 
(Brandolini et al. 2004). The discrepancy between the SHIW estimates and the corresponding 
aggregate figures is lower,  albeit still  remarkable,  in the case of  real assets,  which were 
underestimated by around 25% for the same period. 
The discrepancies between aggregate and survey data can be accounted for on several grounds: 
firstly,  by  the existence of irreconcilable  differences  in classifications and definitions, which 
prevent micro and macro data from being fully comparable; and secondly,  by  interviewees’ 
tendency to be reticent about the assets they actually own (non-reporting) or to under-value their 
declared asset holdings (under-reporting). 
A  range of statistical techniques have been adopted in  to correct for non-reporting and under-
reporting,  of  both  financial assets and dwellings not occupied by their owners,  in the SHIW 
(Cannari and D’Alessio 1990, 1993).  These correction procedures  have a substantial impact on 
those surveys carried out in the  1990s. Overall, the shortfall  compared with  macro sources is 
reduced from 75 to 39 % for total financial assets, from 26 to 8 % for real assets, and from 41 to 17 
% for net worth (Brandolini et al. 2004). However, the corrections vary considerably from one year 
to the next, and consequently so do the remaining discrepancies with respect to aggregate figures. 
Although we believe that the adjusted data could paint a more realistic picture of the distribution of 
household wealth than the one implied by the raw micro data, we have yet to perform any statistical 
adjustment; however, we aim to deal with non-reporting and under-reporting in the near future. This 
will allow us to test the robustness of our current results and their sensitivity to the statistical 
corrections. In the light of these considerations, we  recommend that  the empirical evidence 
presented in section 5 be interpreted with particular care. 
 
 
4.  The calculation of social security wealth 
 
The survey data (SHIW) do not contain information about  social security wealth, and so the present 
section describes how we estimated this variable. Social security wealth is defined as the sum of   8 
expected future benefits less the sum of contributions a worker expects to pay between the time of 
observation and his/her retirement. According to this definition, at each point of time and for each 
individual, social security wealth expresses an individual’s accrued entitlements to wealth resulting 
from participation in the public pension scheme. 
For each individual present in the six surveys (1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002) we first 
computed the present value of future pension benefits. In doing so we used information about age, 
gender, occupation, seniority, expected retirement age, earnings, life expectancy and the relevant 
social security legislation in  force during  the year of observation. Next we estimated the present 
value of the individual’s contributions to his/her pension scheme and we net out this value from the 
current value of future benefits. Both future pensions and future contributions are discounted back 
to the year of observation in order to render the value of  social security wealth comparable with 
other components of total wealth. 
Since figures for net worth are collected at the household level, we need to sum up social security 
wealth computed at time t for each household. In theoretical terms, for household i observed at time 
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where N is the maximum number of individuals within the household receiving a pension, p is the 
expected year of retirement of individual j, d is the life expectancy at retirement of individual j, Pp 
is the pension benefit received upon retirement, r is the discount rate, i is the real annual growth of 
the pension benefit, ck is the payroll tax rate at year k and Wk is gross wage at year k. 
The estimation of social security wealth n ecessarily involves numerous approximations together 
with the use of a series of hypotheses, all of which we shall be looking at in the next part of this 
section. In particular, we have adopted the following hypotheses: 
1.  we express all values in 2002 constant Euros, and we assume perfect foresight regarding 
future inflation and a complete price-indexation mechanism; 
2.  we assume that workers have full knowledge of the pension rules; 
3.  there are two forms of reasoning leading individuals to retire: either they have a sufficient 
number of years of pension contributions to access a seniority pension, and thus they leave 
the job immediately;  or they exit the labour market when they reach the legal retirement 
age;   9 
4.  life expectancies used for the computation of social security wealth are taken from 
forecasted survival estimations furnished by Istat; 
5.  lifetime earnings used to compute future pension benefits and future contributions are 
estimated in terms of gender, of three different levels of education, of ten cohorts, and for 
employees and the self-employed separately; 
6.  a constant rate of growth of gross wages and the discount rate is assumed; 
7.  indexation of pensions only corresponded to earnings growth in 1991. Thereafter, pensions 
for each individual have been kept constant in real terms. 
 
 
4.1  Earnings profiles 
 
The estimation of lifetime earnings is particularly important because the calculation of the level of 
pension benefit has gradually shifted from a final-salary formula (adopted in 1991) to a lifetime-
earnings formula (1992), and then to a contribution-related formula. We have estimated 12 stylised 
profiles of lifetime earnings obtained from  a  combination ofgender, education (three levels - 
primary, secondary and tertiary) and employment status (employee or self-employed). We also take 
explicit account of cohort effects by introducing a set a cohort dummies into the regression. 
The income figures from the surveys are net of personal income tax, and so we grossed up net 
incomes using the following procedure : by definingYNi and YLi as the net income and the gross 
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Yj  =  the upper limit of personal income tax income bracket j; 
tj  =  the marginal tax rate of income bracket j; 
Di  =  tax credit; 
YLj+n < YNi < YLj+n-1. 
We computed gross earnings for the 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002 surveys by taking 
account of those changes in the personal income tax law  made during the period in question. 
Earnings profiles by gender, occupation and educational level are obtained as a result of regressing   10 
the logarithm of gross earnings on a third degree polynomial on age and a set of cohort dummies. 
The shape of earnings profiles for different occupations, gender and educational levels are observed 
in figures 1 and 2. Estimated gross wages are then calculated on the basis of regression coefficients, 
taking into account estimated cohort effects and a constant annual real growth rate of 1%. 
 
Figure 1 



































4.2  Computation of pension benefits 
 
In order to take account of the effects of the three pension reforms introduced in  1992, 1995 and 
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during the year in which the individual from the sample was observed. Firstly, we isolated retired 
people: pensions are not calculated for this group, since SHIW surveys report the net value of 
pension benefits received. In order to maintain a degree of homogeneity with the estimated values 
of future pension benefits for the active population, we grossed up net pension benefits by following 
the same procedure described in the previous subsection. The active population was split into three 
different groups according to seniority accrued in 1992. In particular, the first group comprised: all 
individuals from the 1991 survey, as no reform had been enacted yet in 1991; and all workers with 
at least 15 years of contributions in 1992. The second group comprised all workers with less than 15 
years of contributions  in 1992. The third group consisted of  all  those workers who entered the 
labour market after 1995. In each of the three groups, employees and the self-employed were 
analysed separately. 
The first year pension benefit is then computed as a weighted average of  various  different 
components. Pension benefits for those individuals in the first group were calculated as follows: 
 
) ( * 2 2 1 1 W N W N r PA + =  
where: 
r = 0.02, N1 and N2 are the number of years of contributions paid in before and after 1992, W1 and 
W2 are pensionable earnings before and after 1992. 
Pension benefits for individuals  in the third group are computed according to the contribution 
related formula introduced after 1995: 
MC k P B * =  
where: 
k is the legal transformation coefficient and MC is the capitalised value of career contributions with 
a real rate of return of 1.5%. Finally, pension benefits for individuals in  the second group were 
computed as a weighted average of PA and PB, the weights, ß and (1-ß), being given, respectively, 
by the ratio between the number of years of contributions made by the individual before and after 
the 1995 reform, and by the total number of working years: 
( ) B A c P P P b b - + = 1  
 
 
5.  The composition and inequality of total household wealth: microeconomic evidence 
 
Having  drawn up  a broad definition of household wealth  with  an incorporated social security 
component, this section presents a series of  new estimates of the composition and distribution of   12 
total wealth in Italy during the period 1991-2002. Our analysis is based on the data sets of the last 
six surveys by the SHIW Historical Archive of the Bank of Italy. 
Median total wealth of an Italian household was about 20 % lower in 2002 than in 1991, as the first 
row in Table 1 shows. However, the decline in real terms was not a continuous one. In fact, after 
falling by 26 % between 1991 and 1998, median total wealth rose by 8 % from 1998 to 2002. 
Median disposable income displayed a similar trend, with a 5.2 % fall during the first half of the 
decade, a subsequent 10% recovery by 1998, and substantial stability thereafter. Mean total wealth 




Mean and Median Household Wealth, 1991-2002 (at 2002 prices in thousands of euro) 
 
  1991  1993  1995  1998  2000  2002  % Change 
1991-2002 
   Total wealth               
Median   314.1  243.6  233.4  230.8  237.0  250.1  -20.4 
Mean  376.7  330.1  315.9  329.7  344.4  358.5  -4.8 
Percent with zero or negative net worth  0.1  1.3  3.2  2.8  2.9  2.8   
               
   Real and financial assets*               
Median   85.1  91.0  93.9  94.9  100.3  106.0  24.6 
Mean  140.4  162.3  161.1  171.2  180.9  189.4  34.9 
Percent with zero or negative net worth  1.4  4.7  4.0  3.8  3.5  3.4   
               
   Social security wealth               
Median   206.2  136.1  112.7  112.9  113.6  121.0  -41.3 
Mean  236.3  167.7  154.8  158.4  163.4  169.1  -28.4 
Percent with zero or negative net worth  13.7  15.6  17.7  16.9  16.6  16.5   
               
   Disposable income**               
Median  23.0  21.3  21.8  24.0  23.6  23.3  1.3 
Mean  26.9  26.1  26.7  28.6  28.7  28.3  5.2 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures 
Median and mean values are expressed at 2002 prices calculated using the consumer price index 
(*) Net of financial liabilities. 
(**) Total household income net of taxes and social security contributions. 
 
The time trend for median total wealth is the product of two opposing tendencies; on the one hand, 
a 25%  increase in real and financial assets, and on the other, a stronger fall in social security 
wealth, with an almost 42% fall in the median figure. The reduction in mean social security wealth 
appears to be mainly concentrated between 1991 and 1995. This reduction may be explained by the 
abolition of the indexation of pensions to real wage growth after 1991, involving all current and 
future pensioners, together with the changes in the computation of pension benefits introduced by   13 
the 1992 and 1995 reforms, which was to chiefly affect young workers and the self-employed. Due 
to its sharp  fall, social security wealth has not accounted for the largest share of household wealth 
since 1995. The rise in net worth is largely attributable to the increase in home-ownership and 
dwelling size, the exceptional rise in house prices, the substantial shift in household portfolios 
towards higher-risk assets, and the remarkable increase in stock market prices during the late 1990s.  
In 2002, the top 1% of all families owned 8% of total household wealth; the top 20% of households 
held 53%. By  focussing on the two components of total wealth, we estimated that the richest 
quintile owned 58% of real and financial assets, and 48% of social security wealth. A more detailed 
breakdown by various different percentiles of wealth distribution is shown in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 
Distribution of Household Wealth, 1991-2002 
 
Year  Percentage Share of Total Wealth and its components held by 
 
  Top 1%  Next 4%  Next 5%  Next 10%  Top 20%  2
nd 20%  3
rd 20%  Bottom 
40% 
Total         
wealth 
               
1991  5.6  11.4  10.1  16.5  43.6  25.5  16.5  14.4 
1993  8.1  13.2  12.5  17.7  51.5  23.3  14.6  10.6 
1995  7.9  15.9  12.7  17.4  53.9  23.6  13.9  8.6 
1998  9.2  15.1  13.0  18.3  55.6  23.4  13.4  7.6 
2000  8.5  15.8  12.9  19.4  56.5  22.4  13.2  7.9 




               
1991  9.7  15.0  11.2  16.3  52.3  22.7  13.4  11.5 
1993  13.3  16.2  13.9  17.5  60.1  20.0  11.5  7.6 
1995  11.0  18.9  13.1  16.8  59.7  21.1  11.6  7.6 
1998  14.6  17.4  13.0  16.5  61.5  19.7  11.4  7.4 
2000  12.8  18.6  13.1  17.7  62.3  18.9  11.2  7.6 




               
1991  3.3  9.4  9.4  16.6  38.7  27.0  18.2  16.7 
1993  3.3  10.3  11.1  17.9  42.7  26.3  17.4  13.4 
1995  4.9  12.9  12.3  18.0  48.1  26.2  16.1  9.5 
1998  3.8  12.9  13.0  20.1  49.8  26.9  15.4  7.8 
2000  4.1  13.0  12.6  20.9  50.8  25.9  15.2  8.1 
2002  3.6  12.5  12.5  19.4  48.4  27.2  15.9  8.5 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures.  
In order to calculate percentile shares, households were ranked according to their total wealth. 
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The figures show that total wealth inequality, while rising steeply at the beginning of the 1990s, 
substantially levelled off  during   the second  half of the decade. For example, the share of total 
wealth held by the top 1% rose from an initial  figure of 5.6 % in 1991 to 7.9 % in 1995, before 
remaining stable around 8-9 %for the rest of the period. The share of total wealth held by the richest 
quintile showed a monotonically increasing trend, from 44 % in 1991 to 56 % in 2000, with only a 
slight  reduction  (from 56.5 to 53.3  %)  between  2000  and 2002. At the other extreme of the 
distribution range, the share of total wealth held by the bottom two quintiles almost halved within 
the space of ten years, falling from 14.4 % in 1991 to 8.2 % at the end of the period. A similar trend 
characterised the inequality  in the distribution of real and financial assets. For example, the share 
held by  the top 1 % grew from an initial 9.7 % to 14.6 % in 1998, before falling to 12.2 % in 2002. 
Not surprisingly, given that social security wealth is essentially correlated with lifetime distribution 
of earnings, it appears concentrated to a much smaller degree than real and financial wealth are. At 
the beginning of the 1990s, the share of social security wealth held by the top 1 % “only” amounted 
to 3.3 %, while the figure for the corresponding percentile with regard to  the distribution of real 
and financial wealth was 9.7 %. The same was true of the shares held by the other percentiles of the 
richest decile of the two distributions. The pension reforms implemented over the last decade seem 
to have  reduced  the equalising effect of social security wealth on total wealth. In fact, the 
percentage of social security wealth accruing to the bottom 40 % of the distribution fell by almost 
one half, from 16.7 to 8.5 %. 
Table 3,  showing  the Gini index for total household wealth and its components, substantially 
confirms the previously-mentioned picture. There was a substantial rise in  total wealth inequality 
during the first part of the period, from almost 41 % to 50 %, followed by a slight upwards trend 
during  the rest of the decade from 50 % to almost 52 %. The major contribution to this upwards 
movement came from social security wealth, whose distribution widened during the first part of the 
decade at a much faster pace than that of both real assets and financial assets. In particular, the Gini 
index for social security wealth rose by around twelve percentage points, from 43 % in 1991 to 55 
% in 1995. It remained roughly stable thereafter until 2002. 
In 1991, social security wealth was the most important household asset, accounting for about 63 % 
of total wealth, as shown in table 4. The second largest asset was real estate, representing  28 % of 
total wealth, followed by business equity (4 %) and transactions and savings accounts (2.5 %). 
Financial liabilities were negligible at round 1 % of total wealth. The two most striking changes that 
took place between 1991 and 2002 were the fall in social security wealth to 47 %, and the rise in 
real estate to 39 %. The relatively low share of financial assets shown in table 4 would seem 
attributable to the previously-mentioned problems of non-reporting and under-reporting.   15 
Table 3 
The Gini Index for Total Household Wealth and its components 
 
  1991  1993  1995  1998  2000  2002 
   Total wealth  40.6  47.4  50.0  51.6  51.8  51.8 
             
   Real and financial assets*  59.1  63.0  61.5  63.4  63.1  62.2 
Real assets  61.0  64.1  62.3  64.2  63.0  62.4 
Financial assets  70.7  73.9  73.9  74.9  80.8  77.3 
Financial liabilities  92.5  92.0  91.6  93.1  93.5  92.6 
             
   Social security wealth  43.4  48.9  55.1  55.8  55.8  55.8 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
(*) Net of financial liabilities. 
 
Table 4 
Composition of Total Household Wealth 
 
  1991  1993  1995  1998  2000  2002 
Real assets  33.5  44.1  45.7  44.9  45.1  46.6 
Real estate  28.1  36.5  39.3  38.0  38.2  39.2 
Business equity  4.3  6.7  5.3  5.9  5.7  5.9 
Valuables  1.1  0.9  1.1  1.0  1.2  1.5 
             
Financial assets  4.5  6.1  6.4  8.0  8.5  7.4 
Transactions and saving accounts  2.5  2.8  2.9  3.9  4.0  4.1 
Government bonds  1.4  1.9  2.3  1.0  1.2  0.7 
Private bonds, equities, mutual funds  0.6  1.4  1.2  3.1  3.3  2.6 
             
Financial liabilities  0.7  1.0  1.1  0.9  1.1  1.2 
             
Real and financial assets*  37.3  49.2  51.0  52.0  52.5  52.8 
             
Social security wealth  62.7  50.8  49.0  48.0  47.5  47.2 
   Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
   (*) Net of financial liabilities. 
 
The ratio of financial assets to total wealth increased from 4.5 % in 1991 to 7.4 % in 2002, reaching 
a peak of 8.5 % in 2000 before the bursting of the financial bubble. Figures show that households 
have  replaced government bonds with  riskier  investments  such as  equities, private bonds and 
mutual funds. 
There are considerable differences in household portfolios, depending on the level of wealth. Tables 
5 and 6 provide a breakdown in terms of the top 1 % of households, the next 19 % and the bottom 
80 %, at the beginning of the period and then at the end. 
In 1991 the richest 1 % of households invested about 44 % of their savings in real estate, and 11 %  
in business equity. Social security wealth accounted for 37.5 % of total wealth. Among the next 19 
% of households, 60 % of their wealth took the form of social security wealth, while real estate   16 
accounted for 30 %. The role of social security wealth was even more pronounced in the case of the 
bottom 80 % of the population, as it accounted for some 69.5 % of their total wealth. 
 
Table 5 
Composition of Household Wealth by Wealth Class in 1991 
 
  All 
Households 
Top 1%  Next 19%  Bottom 80% 
   Real assets  33.5  56.1  35.9  27.6 
Real estate   28.1  43.7  30.1  24.0 
Business equity    4.3  10.8  4.8    2.4 
Valuables    1.1    1.6    1.0    1.2 
         
   Financial assets    4.5    6.6    5.0    3.7 
Transactions and saving accounts    2.5    2.4    2.3    2.3 
Government bonds    1.4    1.4    1.9    1.2 
Private bonds, equities, mutual funds    0.6    3.2    0.8    0.2 
         
Financial liabilities    0.7    0.2    0.6    0.8 
         
   Real and financial assets*  37.3  62.5  40.3  30.5 
         
   Social security wealth  62.7  37.5  59.7  69.5 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures  




Composition of Household Wealth by Wealth Class in 2002 
 
  All 
Households 
Top 1%  Next 19%  Bottom 80% 
   Real assets  46.6  63.6  43.9  41.1 
Real estate   39.2  41.9  37.6  37.9 
Business equity    5.9  16.3    5.0  1.9 
Valuables    1.5    5.4    1.3  1.3 
         
   Financial assets    7.4  14.1    7.6  5.5 
Transactions and saving accounts    4.1    8.5    3.6  3.8 
Government bonds    0.7    1.2    1.0  0.5 
Private bonds, equities, mutual funds    2.6    4.4    3.0  1.2 
         
Financial liabilities    1.2    0.4    0.6  1.6 
         
   Real and financial assets*  52.8  77.3  50.9  45.0 
         
   Social security wealth  47.2  22.7  49.1  55.0 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
(*) Net of financial liabilities. 
 
Eleven years later the picture was rather different. Social security wealth accounted for a smaller 
share of total wealth fall all categories, while the weight of real estate rose sharply in the case of all   17 
percentiles of the distribution with the exception of the richest one. The growing weight of net 
worth was particularly evident in the top 1 %, where the two items underlying the substantial 
increase in the share in real and financial assets were business equities and financial assets. 
Figure 3 shows the ratio of net worth, social security wealth and total wealth (by age class) to the 
overall mean of the corresponding variable (1991, 1995 and 2002). Cross-sectional data such as 
those presented here as we all know, do not enable us to draw up a true life-cycle profile because of 
the simultaneous presence of age, time and cohort effects. Notwithstanding this limitation, figures 
show that at the beginning of the decade, the net worth held by elderly households (aged 65 and 
over) amounted to approximately 70-80 % of the overall mean. In the same year, the peak value of 
net worth (1.28) was reached by the 45-54 age-group. From 1991 to 2002 younger age groups saw 
their ratio drop from 69 to 60 %. If we now consider the age distribution of social security wealth, 
we see that the changes which took place during the decade were much more significant. In 1991 
the  younger households’ ratio was approximately equal to one. The same ratio reached a peak 
(1.34)  for the 45-54 age group and decreased thereafter. The picture was rather different after 
implementation of  the two pension reforms, which particularly affected  younger generations, 
especially those aged below 34 who saw their ratio fall to 0.4 in 1995 and to 0.3 in 2002. The very 
slow transition to the new pension system at the same time produced a relative improvement for 
adult generations, and in particular for those aged between 54 and 64. The shifts in the distribution 
of social security wealth over the past decade have also affected the changes in the ratio of mean 
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Figure 3 
 Age distribution of wealth 
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A further way to elicit those factors  underlying changes in the size distribution of  total  wealth 
during the l ast decade is through the decomposition of inequality indices by homogeneous 
subgroups of the population. Our aim is to disentangle the inequality within groups from the 
inequality between groups. We used an index of the class of entropy measures, the half squared 
coefficient of variation, which can be obtained from the following general formula, when a = 2: 
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where N is the total number of households, wi is the wealth of household i and µ is the mean value 
of wealth. One useful characteristic of this index is  that it permits the exact decomposition of 
inequality by population subgroups even in the presence of negative values of wealth. In order to 
separate the “between” and “within” components, and at the same time to isolate the impact of the 
changes in population shares that occurred from 1991 to 2002, we have rewritten the half-squared 















































W is the within-groups component net of variations in  relative group sizes, E
B is the 
corresponding between-group component, E
P is a residual term which depurates the effects on total 
inequality  caused  by changes in population share, K is the number of groups into which the 
population can bedivided, pk are the population weights calculated in the base year (2002), µk is the 
mean value of wealth for group k, and µ* is the total mean at fixed weights according to the formula 
µ* = Sk pk µk.  
The results of the decomposition of inequality into different population subgroups are presented in 
Table 7. T he population  (heads of households)  has been sorted into five sociodemographic 
categories: area of residence, education, work status, age and gender. In keeping  with the results 
obtained  by Brandolini et al. (2004), who performed the same analysis on net worth, overall 
inequality in total wealth is  mainly accounted for by the within-component, while the between-
component appears to play a marginal role. This result holds for all our partitioning. For example, 
in 2002 the differences across households, grouped by area of residence, accounted for just 1.7 % of 
total inequality, while the remaining 98.3 % was determined by the inequality within each single 
geographical area. The contribution of the between-group component  had been  even smaller in 
previous years (with the sole exception of 2000), ranging f rom 0.5 in 1991 to 1.9 in 1995. The 
“education” category revealed the greatest between-group inequality; however, even in this case the 
within-group component played a much greater role . 
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Table 7 
Decomposition of the Half-Squared Coefficient of Variation by Population Subgroup 
 
Year  Within-groups at fixed 
weights 
Value             Share 
Between-groups at fixed 
weights 
Value              Share 
Group relative size effect 
Value            Share 
Total 
 
Area of residence (1) 
1991  1,800  99.0  0.009  0.5  0.010  0.5  1,819 
1993  1,601  97.8  0.013  0.8  0.022  1.4  1,637 
1995  1,267  97.8  0.025  1.9  0.003  0.3  1,295 
1998  1,671  98.7  0.022  1.3  -0.001  -0.1  1,692 
2000  1,561  97.7  0.033  2.1  0.003  0.2  1,598 
2002  1,780  98.3  0.030  1.7  -  -  1,810 
               
Education of household head (2) 
1991  1,701  93.5  0.035  1.9  0.082  4.5  1,819 
1993  1,538  94.0  0.062  3.8  0.037  2.2  1,637 
1995  1,214  93.8  0.063  4.8  0.018  1.4  1,295 
1998  1,615  95.5  0.060  3.5  0.016  1.0  1,692 
2000  1,527  95.6  0.053  3.3  0.018  1.1  1,598 
2002  1,757  97.1  0.053  2.9  -  -  1,810 
               
Work status of household head (3) 
1991  1,978  108.7  0.054  3.0  -0.213  -11.7  1,819 
1993  1,570  95.9  0.061  3.7  0.006  0.3  1,637 
1995  1,267  97.9  0.042  3.2  -0.015  -1.1  1,295 
1998  1,644  97.2  0.053  3.2  -0.006  -0.3  1,692 
2000  1,557  97.5  0.033  2.1  0.007  0.4  1,598 
2002  1,759  97.2  0.051  2.8  -  -  1,810 
               
Age of household head (4) 
1991  1,819  100.0  0.029  1.6  -0.029  -1.6  1,819 
1993  1,625  99.3  0.038  2.3  -0.027  -1.6  1,637 
1995  1,311  101.2  0.039  3.0  -0.055  -4.2  1,295 
1998  1,672  98.8  0.043  2.5  -0.023  -1.4  1,692 
2000  1,560  97.6  0.039  2.4  -0.001  0.0  1,598 
2002  1,767  97.6  0.043  2.4  -  -  1,810 
               
Gender of Household head 
1991  2,002  110.1  0.042  2.3  -0.225  -12.4  1,819 
1993  1,635  99.9  0.040  2.5  -0.039  -2.4  1,637 
1995  1,306  100.9  0.037  2.9  -0.048  -3.7  1,295 
1998  1,707  100.9  0.041  2.4  -0.056  -3.3  1,692 
2000  1,579  98.8  0.022  1.4  -0.003  -0.2  1,598 
2002  1,790  98.9  0.020  1.1  -  -  1,810 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
(1)  The three areas of residence are: Northern Italy, Central Italy, Southern Italy and the Islands. 
(2)  The three levels of education of household heads are: no formal education  or primary school; middle 
school or high school; university degree. 
(3) The five levels of work status of household heads are: blue-collar worker or office worker; senior official 
or manager; self-employed; pensioner; other (first-job seeker, unemployed, housewife, etc.). 
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6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper estimates an “augmented” measure of net worth including social security wealth, and it 
examines the composition and distribution of this augmented wealth among Italian households 
during the period 1991-2002. The main aim  of this analysis  is  to evaluate the impact of the 
structural pension reforms introduced over the last decade on the distribution of total wealth. Our 
evidence is based on the last six cross-sections of the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income 
and Wealth. 
Augmented wealth was found to have fallen during the last decade as the combined result of two 
opposing factors, namely an increase in net worth (i.e. real and financial assets net of debts) and a 
stronger, parallel decline in social security wealth, due to the two main pension reforms introduced 
in 1992 and 1995. The rise of net worth is largely attributable to an increase in home-ownership and 
dwelling size, a rise in house prices, a shift in household portfolios towards risk-bearing assets, and 
the increase in stock market prices that marked the late 1990s. The key factors  underlying  the 
reduction  in social security wealth were the abolition of  indexation of pensions to real wages 
growth after 1991, which affected all current and future pensioners, together with the changes made 
to  the  computation of pension benefits, which mainly affected young workers and  the  self-
employed. 
After rising steeply at the beginning of the 1990s, augmented wealth inequality levelled off during 
the second part of the period. The major contribution to the initial rise came from social security 
wealth, the distribution of which, although less unequal than the distribution of real and financial 
wealth, widened during the first  half of the decade at a much faster pace. In fact, the pension 
reforms  implemented over the last decade seem to have reduced the equalising effect of social 
security wealth on augmented wealth.  
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